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Abstract 
 In this paper, the author used a Structured Equation Modeling 
approach to capture the factors affecting selling prices of gold on eBay. The 
research showed that almost 99% of the variation in the auction’s selling 
price can be explained by the item’s calculated price (using the Gold daily 
spot rate). Auction prices of scrap Gold (per gram) was also found to be 
higher than that of useable gold. Though, unlike previous researches, 
shipping cost was not found to have any noticeable effect on the final auction 
price. 
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Introduction 
 Highfill & O’Brien [2007] studied bidding and prices for online art 
auctions and concluded that a number of variables have significantly affected 
the number of bids. These variables includes: a higher minimum bid which 
decreased the number of bids, but the effect was small; availability of the 
buy-it-now option decreased the number of bids; a longer auction length 
increased bids; and an increased shipping and handling fees decreased bids 
by adding to the overall cost of an item, though the effect was small. They 
also concluded that an increase in the number of bids significantly increased 
the final sales price.  
 Song and Baker [2007] conducted a field study to elucidate critical 
factors that determine sellers’ net revenue in Internet auctions using two 
datasets of Internet auctions. One dataset was for the auction of a DVD, 
while the other was for the auction of an MP3 player. They concluded that 
the buy-it-now option, number of payment options, number of pictures, and 
number of delivery methods were found to be significant predictors for the 
outcome of the MP3 player auction, but not for the DVD auction. 
Conversely, auction duration and feedback ratings were found to be 
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significant in DVD auctions, but not in MP3 player auctions. They also 
identified the potential role of the product type in Internet auction research 
and concluded that “it is conceivable that consumer electronics, collectibles, 
and commodity-like items—to name only a few types—may have specific 
sets of variables that influence the final price they bring and the net revenue 
they are able to generate when auctioned”. 
 Dimoka, Hong, and Pavlou [2012] reported that auctions that receive 
price premiums are those that last longer (Melnik and Alm 2005), end on 
weekends [Kauffman and Wood 2006] and during business hours 
[McDonald and Slawson 2002], and that are prominently displayed [Pavlou 
and Dimoka 2006]. The number of auction bids was also linked to the price 
premiums [Ba and Pavlou 2002]. 
 Ye et al. [2013] explained that as a signal of quality, reputation can 
reduce consumers’ concern about risk, enhance the trust between buyers and 
sellers [Ba and Pavlou 2002; Utz et al. 2009], and thus contribute to better 
sales performance and higher sales prices or sales volumes [Melnik and Alm 
2002]. Therefore, this explains why the seller’s positive feedback was found 
in the literature to affect the selling price [Brint 2003, Gilkeson, and 
Reynolds 2003; McDonald and Slawson 2002; Standifird 2001; Standifird et 
al. 2004]. 
 Bland et al. [2007] believed that a lower starting price should make 
potential consumers more willing to bid because of the perception of less 
financial risk. Also, it increases the likelihood of a transaction occurring. 
Swinyard and Smith [2003] reported that online consumers are sensitive to 
high shipping costs. Bland et al. (2007) also indicated that a lower shipping 
price associated with an eBay auction will result in both a higher value of the 
final bid and a higher likelihood of a transaction actually occurring. 
 Houser and Wooders [2006], McDonald and Slawson [2002], and 
Dewan and Hsu [2004] were unable to establish any relationship between the 
length of an auction and the final price. In contrast, Lucking-Reiley et al. 
[2000] found that the length of an auction was positively related to price. 
 In addition to the above, a number of factors have been repeatedly 
shown in the literature to affect the final selling price in an eBay auction. 
However, the initial bid value was shown to have a negative effect on the 
final price [Ba and Pavlou 2002; Brint 2003; Gilkeson and Reynolds 2003; 
McDonald and Slawson 2002; Standifird 2001; Standifird et al. 2004]. The 
number of bids in an action was also found to affect the final price [Gilkeson 
and Reynolds 2003; McDonald and Slawson 2002; Standifird 2001; 
Dholakia, 2005]. In addition, shipping cost was also found to influence the 
final price [Gilkeson and Reynolds 2003; McDonald and Slawson 2002; 
Bruce 2004]. 
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Structure Equation Modeling 
 Structure Equation Modeling (SEM) technique is a second-generation 
multivariate technique that combines aspects of both multiple regression and 
factor analysis to estimate a series of interrelated dependence relationships in 
a simultaneous manner [Hair et al. 1995].  This technique is very flexible 
because it can deal with a number of regression equations simultaneously. 
Thus, the same variable may represent a dependent variable in one equation 
and an independent variable in another equation.  
 
Date and Model Variables 
 In this research, the author collected data from completed auctions of 
gold items on eBay between January 2012 and June 2013.  The author also 
searched for past eBay auctions where the selected auctions were bid 
randomly as long as the total weight of gold in the auction was specifically 
indicated. This is clearly important in order to be able to calculate the value 
of Gold using the spot rate. The sample consisted of 109 completed sets of 
variables (except for the auction duration, which only had 105 values). 
However in this research, four endogenous variables were used: 
• Selling Price 
• Total Price=Selling Price + Shipping Cost 
• Number of bids (bids) 
• Number of bidders (bidders) 
And the following exogenous variables were used: 
• Calculated price=weight X Spot price of Gold 
• Period: auction duration (3, 7, or 10 days)  
• Seller positive feedback 
• Seller feedback score 
• Shipping cost 
• Relative Start (rel_start)=starting bid/selling price 
• Relative Shipping (rel_shipping)=shipping cost/selling price 
• Scrap: Damaged items that could not be used immediately were 
designated as “scrap” and were given the value of “1”. Items that can 
be immediately used are given “0”. The author subjectively evaluated 
auction items and assigned values between 0 and 1 (in increments of 
.25) to describe the state of the auctioned item. 
 
The Research Models 
 In this research, four models were presented. In the first model 
(Model 1), the covariances between the residuals of the three endogenous 
variables are restricted to zero. In the second model (Model 2), we loosen 
this restriction, and allowed the covariances to exist between the residuals of 
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the three endogenous variables. In the third model (Model 3), we allowed 
covariances to exist between the residuals of the Bids and the Selling Price, 
as well as between the residuals of Bidders and the Selling Price. In addition, 
we restricted the covariance between the residuals of the Bids and the 
Bidders to zero. In the fourth model (Model 4), we allowed covariances 
between the residuals of Bids and Bidders and restrict covariances between 
the residuals of Selling Price and both Bids and Bidders to zero.  
 
Data Analysis 
Model 1 
 By using STATA’s built-in Generalized SEM functionality, the 
author tested Model 1 (Figure 1.). The results are shown in Table 1. It is 
clear from the results that the following variables have a positive effect on 
selling price: 1) scrap, 2) seller positive percentage, 3) calculated price, and 
4) number of bidders. However, the number of bids on the other hand had a 
negative effect on price.  
 The results also showed that the number of bids, auction duration and 
the relative start price have a positive effect on the number of bidders in an 
auction, while the auction duration and the relative start price have a positive 
effect on the number of bids.  
 
Figure 1: Model 1 
  
sellingprice1
bidders
2
bids
3
sellerspositive
calculatedprice
periodrel_start
scrap
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Table 1: GSEM Results for Model 1 
 Coef. Std. Err. Z P>z 95% Conf. Interval 
sellingprice       bidders 13.04086 5.660486 2.3 0.021 1.94651 24.13521 
bids -5.175908 2.256439 -2.29 0.022 -9.598446 -0.7533688 
sellerspositive 4.842017 1.022836 4.73 0 2.837295 6.846739 
calculatedprice 0.9872934 0.0067244 146.82 0 0.9741137 1.000473 
scrap 116.3081 35.02449 3.32 0.001 47.66132 184.9548 
_cons -588.1938 106.5567 -5.52 0 -797.0411 -379.3466 
bidders       bids 0.2487593 0.0254163 9.79 0 0.1989443 0.2985744 
period 0.3196314 0.0792817 4.03 0 0.1642422 0.4750206 
rel_start -3.203303 0.776989 -4.12 0 -4.726174 -1.680433 
_cons 4.251041 0.6193855 6.86 0 3.037068 5.465014 
bids       period 0.6678514 0.2996085 2.23 0.026 0.0806294 1.255073 
rel_start -20.00911 2.272643 -8.8 0 -24.46341 -15.55481 
_cons 18.15829 1.59813 11.36 0 15.02601 21.29057 
var(e.sellingprice) 20154.28 2816.072   15326.13 26503.43 var(e.bidders) 4.869019 0.6719886   3.715049 6.381437 var(e.bids) 72.87571 10.06728   55.5898 95.53675 
 
 It is worthy to note here that the above results can almost be exactly 
replicated by replacing the selling price variable with the total price variable 
(Table 2.). The only difference between the two variables is that while the 
latter includes the item’s shipping cost, the former does not.  
Table 2: GSEM Results for Model 1 With Total Price as Endogenous Variable 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 95% Conf. Interval 
totalprice       bidders 14.29952 5.736827 2.49 0.013 3.055549 25.5435 
Bids -5.515597 2.286968 -2.41 0.016 -9.997972 -1.033222 
sellerspositive 4.847471 1.036732 4.68 0 2.815514 6.879428 
calculatedprice 0.9885051 0.0068158 145.03 0 0.9751465 1.001864 
scrap 114.8629 35.50033 3.24 0.001 45.28353 184.4423 
_cons -589.2201 108.0043 -5.46 0 -800.9046 -377.5355 
bidders       bids 0.2487593 0.0266645 9.33 0 0.1964979 0.3010208 
period 0.3196314 0.0794643 4.02 0 0.1638842 0.4753786 
rel_start -3.203303 0.7935604 -4.04 0 -4.758653 -1.647953 
_cons 4.251041 0.636453 6.68 0 3.003616 5.498466 
bids <-       period 0.6678514 0.2996085 2.23 0.026 0.0806294 1.255073 
rel_start -20.00911 2.272643 -8.8 0 -24.46341 -15.55481 
_cons 18.15829 1.59813 11.36 0 15.02601 21.29057 
       var(e.totalprice) 20705.65 3035.148   15535.13 27597.05 var(e.bidders) 4.869019 0.6719888   3.715048 6.381438 var(e.bids) 72.87571 10.06611   55.59155 95.53375 
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Model 2 
 In this model, we do not restrict any of the covariances between the 
residuals of the three endogenous variables. After 2302 iterations, STATA 
returned the following results (Table 3). 
Table 3: GSEM Results for Model 2 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 95% Conf. Interval 
Sellingprice       
Bidders 44.61616 37.21156 1.2 0.231 -28.31715 117.5495 
Bids -19.62662 16.2546 -1.21 0.227 -51.48504 12.23181 
Sellerspositive 4.887518 1.020894 4.79 0 2.886603 6.888433 
Calculatedprice 0.9884571 0.0068116 145.11 0 0.9751066 1.001808 
Scrap 99.42179 37.73393 2.63 0.008 25.46466 173.3789 
_cons -631.1355 132.2805 -4.77 0 -890.4005 -371.8706 
Bidders       Bids 0.246912 5.983382 0.04 0.967 -11.4803 11.97412 
Period 0.3208725 4.013816 0.08 0.936 -7.546063 8.187808 
rel_start -3.24025 119.6885 -0.03 0.978 -237.8253 231.3448 
_cons 4.28455 108.5697 0.04 0.969 -208.5081 217.0772 
Bids       Period 0.6678259 0.307371 2.17 0.03 0.0653898 1.270262 
rel_start -20.00917 2.27812 -8.78 0 -24.4742 -15.54414 
_cons 18.15841 1.630386 11.14 0 14.96291 21.35391 
var(e.sellingprice) 28401.59 19105.96 7598.595 106157.9   var(e.bidders) 4.869267 1.744815 2.412408 9.828256   var(e.bids) 72.8757 10.05803 55.60362 95.51299   cov(e.bidders,e.sellingprice) -151.7838 3238.62 -0.05 0.963 -6499.363 6195.795 
cov(e.bids,e.sellingprice) 525.8275 547.5674 0.96 0.337 -547.3849 1599.04 
cov(e.bids,e.bidders) 0.1346315 436.0466 0 1 -854.501 854.7702 
 
 This model can be rejected because the coefficients of the covariance 
terms as well as the coefficients of some of the other variables are 
insignificant. It is interesting to note that in spite of this, we still see that the 
Seller’s Positive Feedback Percentage, the Calculated Price, and the fact that 
the item is Scrap or not are still positively affecting the Selling Price. 
 
Model 3 
 In this model (see Figure 2), we restricted the covariance between the 
residuals of Bids and Bidders to zero, and allowed the covariance between 
the residuals of Selling Price and Bids. Also, we restricted the covariance 
between the residuals of Selling Price and Bidders to take any value.  
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Figure 2: Model 3 
 
 We can see from the results (Table 4.) that all the coefficients of the 
model are significant and that the covariance between the residuals of Bids 
and Selling Price, as well as the covariance between the residuals of Bidders 
and Selling Price are also significant. This model accordingly confirms again 
that the number of Bidders, Seller Positive Percentage, as well as Scrap all 
have a positive effect on the Selling Price, while the number of Bids 
negatively affects the Selling Price. The model also confirms that the 
Auction Duration as well as the Relative Start Price has both a positive effect 
on both the number of Bids as well as the number of Bidders. In addition, the 
number of bids also has a positive effect on the number of Bidders which 
creates another channel through which the number of bids affects the Selling 
Price.  
Table 4: GSEM Results for Model 3 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 95% Conf. Interval 
Sellingprice       Bidders 44.70998 9.079025 4.92 0 26.91542 62.50454 
Bids -19.66667 4.261289 -4.62 0 -28.01864 -11.3147 
Sellerspositive 4.887634 1.020412 4.79 0 2.887664 6.887605 
Calculatedprice 0.9884602 0.006706 147.4 0 0.9753167 1.001604 
Scrap 99.39716 36.18062 2.75 0.006 28.48444 170.3099 
_cons -631.3172 113.8286 -5.55 0 -854.4172 -408.2172 
Bidders       Bids 0.248761 0.025259 9.85 0 0.1992543 0.2982678 
Period 0.3195486 0.0744306 4.29 0 0.1736673 0.4654299 
rel_start -3.20338 0.7730088 -4.14 0 -4.71845 -1.688311 
_cons 4.251388 0.6026324 7.05 0 3.070251 5.432526 
Bids       Period 0.6681341 0.2843151 2.35 0.019 0.1108867 1.225382 
rel_start -20.00875 2.263745 -8.84 0 -24.4456 -15.57189 
sellingprice1
bidders
2
bids
3
sellerspositive
calculatedprice
periodrel_start
scrap
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_cons 18.157 1.535358 11.83 0 15.14776 21.16625 
var(e.sellingprice) 28449.73 5191.598   19895.2 40682.55 var(e.bidders) 4.869219 0.6817477   3.700677 6.406746 var(e.bids) 72.87458 10.0575   55.60333 95.51055 cov(e.bidders,e.sellingprice) -153.2326 47.81898 -3.2 0.001 -246.9561 -59.50916 
cov(e.bids,e.sellingprice) 527.0323 238.1057 2.21 0.027 60.35368 993.711 
 
Model 4 
 In this model, we allowed covariances between the residuals of Bids 
and Bidders, and restricted covariances between the residuals of Selling 
Price and both Bids and Bidders to zero. After 16000 iterations (the default 
maximum number of iterations), STATA was not able to achieve 
convergence. Therefore, by increasing the number of iterations to 25000 and 
rerunning the model, the results were still the same.  
 The Effect of Shipping Cost 
 There has been contradicting evidence from the literature with 
regards to the effect of Shipping Cost on Selling Price. By adding the 
shipping cost to model 1, it becomes apparent (Table 5.) that the coefficient 
associated with it is not significant. To confirm the result, the author added 
Shipping Cost to model 3 (allowing for covariance between the Selling Price 
residuals and the residuals of Bids and Bidders). However, not only was the 
resulting coefficient of the Shipping Cost variable insignificant, but also, the 
coefficients of the covariance terms were insignificant. Accordingly, we can 
not prove in this paper that shipping cost affects the selling price.  
Table 5: GSEM Results for Model 1 after Adding Shipping Cost 
 Coef. Std. Err. Z P>z 95% Conf. Interval 
sellingprice       bidders 11.22437 5.807205 1.93 0.053 -0.1575443 22.60628 
bids -4.685671 2.274687 -2.06 0.039 -9.143977 -0.2273659 
sellerspositive 4.834146 1.015332 4.76 0 2.844132 6.824159 
calculatedprice 0.9855446 0.0068215 144.48 0 0.9721746 0.9989145 
scrap 118.3937 34.80729 3.4 0.001 50.17266 186.6147 
shipingcost 1.443189 1.16023 1.24 0.214 -0.830819 3.717197 
_cons -586.7128 105.7795 -5.55 0 -794.0368 -379.3887 
bidders       bids 0.2487593 0.0255508 9.74 0 0.1986807 0.298838 
period 0.3196314 0.079301 4.03 0 0.1642044 0.4750584 
rel_start -3.203303 0.7787534 -4.11 0 -4.729632 -1.676974 
_cons 4.251041 0.6212076 6.84 0 3.033496 5.468585 
bids       period 0.6678514 0.2996085 2.23 0.026 0.0806294 1.255073 
rel_start -20.00911 2.272643 -8.8 0 -24.46341 -15.55481 
_cons 18.15829 1.59813 11.36 0 15.02601 21.29057 
       var(e.sellingprice) 19858.79 2789.427   15079.62 26152.62 var(e.bidders) 4.869019 0.6719886   3.715049 6.381437 var(e.bids) 72.87571 10.06965   55.58627 95.54283 
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 It might be argued though that what really affects selling price is not 
the shipping cost but the relative shipping cost (Shipping Cost divided by the 
Selling Price). The logic behind this is that a potential buyer will view a $10 
shipping cost differently when the item is worth $50 versus when it is worth 
$1000. To accommodate for this, the author introduced the Relative Shipping 
variable (shipping cost/selling price) and then tested the model again using 
STATA. It is clear from Table 6 that the coefficient associated with this 
variable is also not significant. Again, we added the Relative Shipping 
variable to model 3, and the results again showed that the coefficient 
associated with this variable was insignificant. Consequently, the coefficients 
of the covariance terms were significant, and so the model was not rejected. 
Both findings have though led us to conclude that both the Shipping Cost as 
well as the Relative Shipping Cost does not affect the selling price.  
Table 6: GSEM Results for Model 1 after Adding Relative Shipping Cost 
 Coef. Std. Err. Z P>z 95% Conf. Interval 
sellingprice       bidders 12.86504 5.650861 2.28 0.023 1.789554 23.94052 
bids -5.237603 2.252318 -2.33 0.02 -9.652064 -0.8231414 
sellerspositive 4.883826 1.022041 4.78 0 2.880663 6.886989 
calculatedprice 0.9858428 0.0070108 140.62 0 0.9721018 0.9995838 
scrap 121.8906 35.80892 3.4 0.001 51.70642 192.0748 
rel_shipping -496.4541 697.4688 -0.71 0.477 -1863.468 870.5597 
_cons -583.4011 106.511 -5.48 0 -792.1588 -374.6434 
bidders       bids 0.2487593 0.0277575 8.96 0 0.1943556 0.3031631 
period 0.3196314 0.0796311 4.01 0 0.1635573 0.4757054 
rel_start -3.203303 0.808427 -3.96 0 -4.787791 -1.618815 
_cons 4.251041 0.6516796 6.52 0 2.973772 5.528309 
bids       period 0.6678514 0.2996085 2.23 0.026 0.0806294 1.255073 
rel_start -20.00911 2.272643 -8.8 0 -24.46341 -15.55481 
_cons 18.15829 1.59813 11.36 0 15.02601 21.29057 
var(e.sellingprice) 20056.57 3060.487   14872 27048.54 var(e.bidders) 4.869019 0.6719889   3.715048 6.381438 var(e.bids) 72.87571 10.06465   55.59374 95.52998 
 
Relationship between Auction Selling Price and the Calculated Price 
Using the Gold Spot Rate 
 It is clear from the above tables that the coefficient of the Calculated 
Price variable is around .99. This implies that a 1 unit increase in the 
calculated price will result to a .99 units increase in the Selling Price. In 
order to understand how variations in the Calculated Price explain variations 
in the Selling Price, we ran a regression of the selling price on the calculated 
price (see Table 7.). Thus, the R2 value was .9939 which implies a very close 
fit.  
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Table 7: Regression Results between Selling Price and Calculated Value 
 
  
 To visualize this relationship, the author plotted a diagram of the 2 
variables as shown in figure 3. All the points seem to lie on the 45 degree 
line together with the very high value of R2, which indicates that the final 
price is highly affected by the calculated price of gold content. Any variation 
in the final selling price not attributed to the calculated price is accordingly 
very small.  
 
Figure 3: Plot of Selling Price Against Calculated Price 
 
The Effect of Auction Duration and Relative Start Price on Final Selling 
Price 
 Both models 1 and 3 show that Auction Duration has a positive effect 
on both the number of Bids and the number of Bidders, and at the same time, 
the Relative Start Price has a negative effect on both the number of Bids and 
the number of Bidders. But since the number of bids has a negative effect on 
                                                                                 
          _cons     2.035259   20.60029     0.10   0.921    -38.80242    42.87294
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the Selling Price and the number of Bidders has a positive effect on Selling 
Price, the cumulative effect of the Auction Duration and the Relative Start 
Price on the Final Selling Price cannot be clearly ascertained. Equations 1, 2, 
and 3 represent the relationships between the variables (see Table 4).  
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 44.71 ∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 − 19.67 ∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠 + ⋯      (1) 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 = .25 ∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠 + .32 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 − 3.2 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑙 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 + ℇ𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 (2) 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠 = .67 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 − 20 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑙 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 + ℇ𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑠           (3) 
 Thus, a one unit increase in the Auction Duration (Period) will result 
in a .32 increase in the number of Bidders, and accordingly in a 14.3 units 
increase in Selling Price. The same increase in the Auction Duration though 
will result in .67 units increase in the number of bids and 13.18 units 
decrease in the Selling Price. The cumulative effect though is 1.12 increase 
in the Selling Price. This is reflected in the following equation (equation 4.). 
𝛥 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 44.71 ∗ .32 − 19.67 ∗ .67 = 1.12                               (4) 
Similarly, a one unit increase in the Relative Start Price (auction start 
price/Selling Price) will result in a 3.2 decrease in the number of Bidders, 
and accordingly to a 143.1 units decrease in the Selling Price. The same one 
unit increase in the Relative Start Price will decrease the number of Bids by 
20 units, and accordingly increase the final Selling Price by 393.4 units. This 
is reflected in the following equation (equation 5.) 
𝛥 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 44.71 ∗ (−3.2) − 19.67 ∗ (−20) = 250.33                (5) 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 By using Structured Equation Modeling, the author was able to 
capture the complexity of the model of the factors that affect selling prices of 
gold on eBay. In this research, three endogenous variables were used: 
number of Bidders, number of Bids, and the Selling Price. As in previous 
researches, the seller’s positive feedback percentage had a positive effect on 
the Selling Price. The item’s calculated value (using the daily spot rate of 
Gold) also had a positive effect on the Selling Price. The research showed 
that almost 99% of the variation in the auction’s selling price can be 
explained by this variable.  
 In this research, the author was able to show that shipping cost does 
not influence selling prices on eBay auctions. Presumably because most 
eBay sellers do not make profit from shipping, and shipping cost is not 
considerable compared to the final selling price.  
 As shown in previous sections, the longer the Auction Duration and 
the lower the Auction Start price, the higher the number of Bidders and the 
number of Bids in the auction. This does not necessarily mean a higher 
Selling Price though. This is due to the fact that both Auction Duration and 
Relative Start Price affect the number of Bids and number of Bidders 
simultaneously, but the latter factors affect the Selling Price in different 
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ways. So, while the number of Bidders have a positive effect on the Selling 
Price, the number of Bids have a negative effect. By taking this into account 
and by calculating the cumulative effect, we showed that a longer Auction 
Duration and a higher Relative Start Price will both result in a higher Selling 
Price.  
 The fact that a higher Start Price has a positive impact on the final 
Selling Price primarily stems from the dampening effect this factor has on 
the number of Bids. Since buyers are able to calculate the exact value of the 
Gold item using the daily sport rate, they do not look favorably at a high 
number of bids because it signals a strong desire to purchase. Therefore, this 
might result in the Selling Price surpassing the Calculated Price. 
 Because buyers seem to be primarily buying Gold for investment and 
not for use, one can conclude that they view a higher number of Bidders as a 
signal of trust in the auction. However, this instills confidence and motivates 
them to bid (which explains the positive relationship between the number of 
Bidders and the Selling Price). On the other hand, the number of bids imply a 
strong desire to purchase which can demotivate buyers from engaging in the 
auction for fear that the Selling Price will be too high (which explains the 
negative relationship between the number of Bids and the Selling Price). 
 Of particular interest was the finding out that the auctions prices of 
scrap gold (per gram) are relatively higher than that of useable gold. This 
discrepancy might imply that there is stronger competition for scrap gold 
and/or willingness of buyers to bid a higher price for it. This seems to run 
against common sense, because while scrap gold can only be used for 
investment, useable Gold can be used both as an investment and as wearable 
jewelry. To explain this, it is important to note that testing the purity of gold 
can result in some damage to the item being tested. While clearly this is not 
an issue with scrap gold, it is an issue when trying to return a useable item to 
the seller after testing it because the item was not in the proper condition it 
was before it was tested.   
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